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Abstract
In order to incentivize stronger issuer due diligence eort, European and U.S. au-
thorities are amending securitization-related regulations to force issuers to retain an
economic interest in the securitization products they issue. This paper contributes
to the process by exploring the economics of equity and mezzanine tranche retention
in the context of systemic risk, moral hazard and accounting frictions. It shows that
screening levels are highest when the loan originating bank retains the equity tranche.
However, most of the time a prot maximizing bank would favor retention of the less
risky mezzanine tranche, thereby implying a suboptimal screening eort from a regu-
lator's point of view. This distortion gets even more pronounced when the economic
outlook is positive or protability is high, implicitly making the case for dynamic and
countercyclical credit risk retention requirements. Finally, the paper illustrates the
importance of loan screening costs for the retention decision and thereby shows that
an unanimous imposition of equity tranche retention might run the risk of shutting
down securitization markets.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its
Executive Board, or its management. We thank Christopher Hennessy, Zsuzsanna Fluck, Laura Kodres,
Corrado Macchiarelli, Jodi Scarlata, Liliana Schumacher, Simon Wolfe and Josef Zechner for intense and
helpful discussions. Finally, we are also grateful to Barbara Casu, Marco Espinosa, Juan Sole and John
Wilson. Any remaining errors are our own.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, European and U.S. authorities are putting
in place new regulations that will force securitizers to retain economic exposure to the as-
sets they securitize in order to better align their interests with those of investors. More
specically, the Article 122a of the European Capital Requirments Directive and Section 941
of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act both impose a
ve percent minimum credit risk retention rate. Both allow for several options, including
retaining just the equity tranche, or equal amounts of all tranches.1
However, a number of recent papers have shown that both the size and form of the retention
are critical to incentivizing due diligence. They imply, for example, that the implementa-
tion should be exible in order to achieve broad-based incentive alignments. Fender and
Mitchell (2009) identify conditions under which mezzanine tranche retention best incentives
loan screening but note that the best incentive mechanism depends on the size of the respec-
tive tranches, the quality of the loan pool and the economic conditions expected during the
life of the securitization. Ki and Kisser (2010) illustrate that even if the loan quality and
the economic outlook are known, it is impossible to design specic policy recommendations
in case tranche sizes are exogenous. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem (2010) stresses the importance of considering the economics of the underlying assets
and securitization structure and, along with IMF (2009), the potential for other incentive
1Securitization is a process in which dierent assets or portfolios of cash ow generating securities are
pooled together and then sold to third parties. This paper focuses on structured nance which further
implies that cash ows of the entire portfolio are tranched into several slices which dier with respect to
their risk-return characteristics. Tranche holders are paid in a specic order, starting with the senior tranches
(least risky) working down through various levels to the equity tranche (most risky). If some of the expected
cash ows are not forthcoming (e.g., some loans default), then, after any cash ow buers are depleted,
the payments to the equity tranche are reduced. If the equity tranche is depleted, then payments to the
mezzanine tranche holders are reduced, and so on up to the senior tranches.
2alignment mechanisms to complement various forms of mandated risk retention.
This paper explores the economics of equity and mezzanine tranche retention in the context
of systemic risk, moral hazard and accounting frictions. Specically, it derives both the
optimal screening activity and retention size of a loan originating and securitizing bank
and thereby provides a clear characterization of its optimal policies. The paper shows that
although equity tranche retention generates the highest screening eort, most of the time
a prot maximizing bank would choose to retain the mezzanine tranche because it requires
less loan screening costs and regulatory capital.
This distortion gets even more pronounced when the loan has a high promised return
or the economy is expected to perform well. The intuition for this result is that a more
favorable environment increases the opportunity costs of retaining funds and thereby makes
equity tranche retention less desirable. Also, loan screening costs have a rst order eect
on the choice between equity and mezzanine tranche retention. The main public policy
implication of these results is that credit risk retention requirements should be based on
accurate estimates of potential screening and opportunity costs, and be conditioned on the
economic outlook. Poorly designed retention schemes further run the danger of actually
shutting down securitization markets.
Furthermore, the paper shows that vertical slice retention is unlikely to dominate equity
tranche retention and that for all the cases analyzed in this paper, even mezzanine tranche
retention is expected to generate higher screening activity. Finally, we present an alterna-
tive risk specication which isolates the impact of loan quality on default risk and thereby
abstracts from the distortions stemming from the systemic risk component. Under this
3more simple setup, the dierence in implied screening eort becomes even more extreme
and equity tranche retention clearly better incentivizes due diligence. Put dierently, the
robustness check underlines the importance of considering the joint impact of systemic risk
and loan quality on the incentives to screen loans.
The paper closely relates to literature dealing with principal agent problems and credit
risk transfer (CRT). Innes (1990) models a principal-agent problem between a risk-neutral
entrepreneur with access to an investment project and an outside investor. The entrepreneur
can exert costly eort to inuence the probability of success of the underlying project but this
action is unobservable and thus non-contractible. Given limited liability of the entrepreneur,
Innes (1990) shows that debt nancing is the corresponding optimal contract. Chiesa (2008)
models a loan originating bank which needs outside nancing and extends the setup to allow
for a systemic risk component. Because a high return does not necessarily mean that the
bank has engaged in monitoring but instead can be the result of a favorable realization of
the systemic risk factor, Chiesa (2008) is able to show that a pure debt contract is not opti-
mal whereas CRT with limited credit enhancements enhances loan monitoring and expands
nancial intermediation.
Fender and Mitchell (2009) adapt the principal agent problem of Innes (1990) to the case
of asset securitization and introduce a systemic risk component into the analysis. They
derive optimal screening eort under various retention mechanisms and show that equity
tranche retention does not necessarily maximize loan screening activity. Using a dynamic
model, Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (2012) focus on the optimal contract for
mortgage backed securities beween an originator and outside investors. Under some technical
assumptions, they are able to show that the optimal contract consists of a one time payment
4to the originator after having a observed a default-free waiting period.
The empirical evidence on the eect of securitization on screening behavior mostly reveals
evidence of a decline in the quality of securitized loans prior to the recent crisis. Krainer
and Laderman (2009) focus on mortgage loans originated in California for the period from
2000 to 2007. Using loan-level data, they show that underwriting standards for private label
securitizations are worse than for U.S. non-securitized loans or securitizations conducted by
the government sponsored entities. This is conrmed by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011)
who analyze subprime mortgage loans issued between 2001 and 2007 and show that loan
quality deteriorated in the years leading up to the nancial crisis. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru,
and Vig (2010) compare the performance of loans with credit scores just above or below
a certain threshold and nd that loans above the threshold suer from a worse ex-post
performance. Given that these loans had a higher likelihood of being securitized, the paper
argues that securitization reduced the bank's loan screening incentives.
Another strand of literature relates to the eect of informational asymmetries, signaling
and pricing of securities. The "lemons problem", as coined by Akerlof (1970), shows that
markets may break down in the presence of informational asymmetries. Leland and Pyle
(1977) use a signaling model to show how agency costs can be mitigated in the context
of a partial rm sale. They model an entrepreneur with superior information regarding
future prospects of assets in place who wants to sell part of his holdings to diversify risk.
The entrepreneur can signal quality by retaining a larger fraction of the asset and thereby
mitigate the agency problem.
5Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) focus on the subsequent adverse selection problem a bank
faces if it engages in loan sales. However, they show that implicit contract features such as
retention of part of the loan and or implicit guarantees against default can make loan sales
possible and thereby reduce agency problems. While Morrison (2005) illustrates that credit
derivatives may destroy the signaling value of debt and thereby cause disintermediation and
lower welfare, Niccolo and Pelizzon (2006) demonstrate that even in the context of credit
risk transfer, banks may signal their own types by using rst-to-default contracts. Similarly,
DeMarzo (2005) shows that if assets are not only pooled but also tranched into dierent
risk-return categories, banks can signal the quality of the sold loan portfolio by retaining
interest in the equity tranche, thereby conrming optimality of a (standard) debt contract.2
This paper compares the eects of equity and mezzanine tranche retention and thereby
builds on the model proposed by Fender and Mitchell (2009). Doing so, we contribute to
the existing literature in several ways. By introducing accounting frictions into the principal
agent problem, we are able to solve for both the optimal loan screening eort and the optimal
level of tranche retention and thereby provide a clear characterization of the optimal retention
policies. This has important implications as equity tranche retention continues to best
incentivize loan screening. Furthermore, using the optimal solutions we are able to analyze
the mismatch between maximizing due diligence and maximizing prots and thereby identify
areas for policy intervention. Specically, we show that the mismatch is highest when the
underlying market is highly protable and the economic outlook is positive.
2Note that this paper deals with the impact of moral hazard on securitization. The reason is that we are
primarily interested in analyzing the impact of credit risk retention requirements on the incentives to screen
loans in the context of accounting frictions and systemic risk.
6The paper proceeds as follows. Section [2] introduces the model and Section [3] presents the
numerical analysis. Section [4] presents results under two alternative model specications.
Section [5] nally concludes.
2 Optimal Retention and Screening Policy
The model centers around a prot maximizing bank which extends individual loans to bor-
rowers and then has the option of securitizing the loan portfolio and selling dierent tranches
to individual investors. The total loan portfolio is normalized to one, outside investors and
the bank are assumed to be risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate is set to zero. A
performing loan returns R > 1 while there is zero recovery for a defaulting loan.
The simplied economy consists of a continuum of good and bad borrowers who dier
in their ability to repay the loan. The proportion of "good" borrowers is captured by the
parameter  which is given exogenously. The bank can exert costly screening eort e to
increase the probability of lending to a good quality borrower. Denoting G and B as the
revised probabilities of lending to good and bad borrowers, it is assumed that
G(e) = ( + e) (1)
B(e) = (1      e) (2)
Screening borrowers is costly, which is captured by the cost function c(e) which is assumed
to be increasing in e and convex, i.e. c(0) = 0, c0(e) > 0 and c00(e) > 0. Similar to Carletti
(2004) and Due (2008), we assume a quadratic cost function, i.e. we set c(e) =

2e2 to
7Good Borrower Bad Borrower
High State 0 PD
Low State PD 1
Table 1: Default Probabilities in the context of systemic risk
account for the convexity in eort costs. It is further assumed that at the time when the
loans are extended, the originator has already decided if and in what form the loan portfolio
will be securitized. Eort level is chosen accordingly and then dierent tranches of the
portfolio are sold to outside investors. Outside investors are only willing to make payments
equal to the expected value of future cash ows conditional on the optimal eort level of the
originator.
The setup also embeds a systemic risk component, i.e. it is assumed that the economy can
be either in a high or a low state and that the corresponding probabilities are given by pL
and pH. The state of the economy has a distinct impact on each borrower. In the high state,
the good borrower is always able to repay the loan while the bad borrower may default with
a probability PD. In the low state, the bad borrower always defaults with probability one
while the good borrower only does so with a probability of PD. Table [1] summarizes the
assumption.
Summing up, we can now dene the expected cash ows of the entire loan portfolio in the
low and the high state of nature of the economy.3
3Note that due to having assumed that there is a continuum of good and bad borrowers with corresponding
subcontinua depending on their idiosyncratic default probabilities, it follows that expected and realized
portfolio cash ows of the individual states of nature coincide.
8PL(e)  [(1   PD)( + e)]R (3)
PH(e)  [( + e) + (1   PD)(1      e)]R (4)
The bank has the option to create a structured product and sell dierent tranches to
outside investors. It is assumed that the structured product consists of a senior tranche, a
mezzanine tranche and an equity tranche. The size of the equity tranche is denoted as t
and, in case the originator retains the mezzanine tranche, the thickness of mezzanine and
equity tranche are identical. This assumption makes sure that in both cases the originator
is exible enough to ensure that the more senior tranches are risk-less, if required, and
comparable. Senior and mezzanine tranche holders are promised a payment of (1 2t)R and
tR in non-default states. When pricing the tranches oered for sale, investors act rationally
and consider the implied optimal screening eort of the bank and the observed size of credit
retention. This is formalized in Assumption [1].4
Assumption 1 Investors are rational and price dierent tranches according to their expected
cash ow, taking into account both the optimal implied eort level e and the observed amount
of retention t.
4Note that there is no Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) in our securitization chain. A reason why SPVs
are usually employed is to separate the cash ows relating to the securitized assets from the overall cash
ows and risk of the bank. Given that in our model the bank generates revenue through one line of business
only, i.e. by lending funds to potential borrowers, the cash ows of the securitized assets and the bank itself
coincide such that there is no need to introduce an additional intermediary into the securitization chain. In
any case, when an SPV is involved, it is common practice for banks to retain an interest in the future cash
ows associated with the securitized assets. Such retained interest includes interest-only strips receivable,
retained subordinated security interests, the funding of cash-collateral accounts, or other forms of credit
enhancements.
9Due to the systemic risk component, the monotone likelihood ratio property does not
always hold which is why debt nancing, i.e. equity tranche retention, is not necessarily
the optimal contract. While the optimal retention mechanism also depends on the systemic
outlook and the idiosyncratic default probabilities, the thickness of the respective tranches
is most relevant as has been illustrated by Ki and Kisser (2010). Even more importantly,
the systemic outlook, the quality of the loan pool and individual default probabilities are
exogenous factors to the bank while the size of retention, or skin in the game, would be
chosen by the bank.
In order to make the retention decision practically relevant, some market friction is needed.
DeMarzo (2005) assumes that the source of market friction is superior valuation ability of
banks which is why they prot from increasing volume, i.e. buying undervalued assets and
selling them at market prices. However, if banks sell everything then they suer from adverse
selection as they are not able to signal the quality of their assets for sale. Alternatively,
Fender and Mitchell (2009) discuss that banks can benet from accounting loopholes as an
upfront sale of the loan portfolio allows for early recognition of prots. This eect can create
a market friction if managerial compensation is linked to it.
To capture this intuition, we assume that whenever the bank sells more senior tranches
and those tranches are expected to be fully paid back, then it may be able to value the
corresponding upfront payments at a premium to its notional amount. On the other hand, if
the bank sells more risky tranches (i.e. sells equity and keeps the mezzanine tranche), then
no premium can be realized with respect to the more risky tranche.
Assumption 2 Banks benet from accounting-related market imperfections and are thus
able to value the proceeds received for selling risk-less senior claims at a premium to the
10notional amount. Under equity tranche retention, the bank values the sale of a risk-less
senior tranche SE(t) = (1   t2)R. Under mezzanine tranche retention, the senior tranche is
valued at SM(t) = (1   4t2)R.
The choice of the specic functional form allows us to capture a benet of securitization in
a reduced form. This eect is illustrated in Figure [1]. The solid blue line plots the xed
upfront payment (1 t)R for dierent values of t in case R is set to 1:1. The dashed green line
displays values corresponding to the concave function (1 t2)R. It can be seen that starting
with a fully retained loan portfolio, i.e. t = 1, the initial marginal benet of securitizing is
very high and it subsequently decreases if a larger fraction of the loan portfolio is sold to
outside investors. We can also see that if the entire portfolio is sold to outside investors,
i.e. t = 0, the benets from securitization are zero such that the originator only values the
upfront payment at its notional value.5
From a practical perspective, equity and mezzanine tranche retention have very dierent
protability implications due to the fact that the Basel framework attaches dierent risk
weights, and thereby costs, to them. We therefore specically introduce capital charges into
the model and assume a linear cost function for capital requirements.
Assumption 3 To capture the various capital charges associated with each of the retention
mechanisms, we assume the following linear cost function
ki(t) = ki  t (5)
5The argument that managerial compensation creates an incentive for management to increase short-
term prots requires a certain degree of intransparency within the rm. In the case of zero retention,
transparency is likely to be high which is why we assume that the benet of securitization is zero. Also,
adding an additional constant excess benet would not change the optimal policies discussed later and would
only distort the protability level.





























Figure 1: Visualizing the Intuition of Assumption [2]: The gure displays the value of the
upfront payment received for selling a riskless senior claim with a promised payment of (1 - t)R.
The solid blue line plots the fair value of the xed upfront payment for dierent values of t in
case R is set to 1:1. The dashed green line displays values corresponding to the concave function
(1   t2)R.
where ki captures capital charges, conditional on the specic retention mechanism. Speci-
cally we assume that ki = CARRWi(R 1) where CAR is the capital adequacy ratio
as implied by the Basel II framework, RWi denotes the risk weight under equity or mezzanine
retention, (R   1) captures the opportunity costs of the capital charges and  is a parameter
capturing the distortions between equity and debt nancing.6
6In fact, if there were no market frictions such that the capital structure choice was irrelevant, then
 would be equal to zero and capital requirements would not matter. In reality, frictions such as the tax
deductibility of interest payments and, in case of banks, the implicit bailout guarantee given by governments,
tend to make debt nancing a less costly option.
12Combining above, we are now able to write down the following general maximization
problem.
max
e;t i(e;t) = Si(t) + Fi(e;t)   c(e)   ki(t)   1 (6)
where i 2 (E;M) denotes either equity or mezzanine tranche retention and Fi(e;t) are
the cash ows relating to the retained credit exposure. The subsequent analysis investigates
how optimal screening eort and tranche size dier depending on whether the bank retains
the equity or the mezzanine tranche.
2.1 Equity Tranche Retention
In case the bank retains interest in the equity tranche, the payo structure is similar to
holding a call option on the performance of the loan portfolio with a strike price equal to the
promised payments to senior and mezzanine tranche holders. Specically, expected prots
of the retained credit exposure are given by
FE(e;t) = pL maxfPL(e)   BE(t);0g + pH maxfPH(e)   BE(t);0g (7)
where BE(t) = (1   t)R is the strike price of equity tranche holders and denotes the
promised payments to mezzanine and senior tranche holders. From a practical perspective,
the bank can either issue riskless senior claims or claims which are expected to default
in the low state of nature.7 Propositions [1] and [2] summarize the corresponding prot
maximization problems.
7In principle, one would also need to check whether it is optimal for the bank to sell debt which is risky
in the high state of nature. Because this scenario is economically not interesting, we abstract from this case.




E1(e;t) = (1   t





2   kEt   1 (8)
s:t: BE(t)  PL(e) (9)
e  1    (10)
e  0 (11)
where [9] is the positive payo constraint of equity tranche holders in the low state of nature
and the minimum and maximum eort constraints [11] and [10] consider the fact that the
probability of making a good loan is bounded by zero and one.
It can be seen that in case the bank sells riskless debt, it has to make sure that the
payo in the low state of nature is sucient to cover promised payments to senior claim
holders. This is guaranteed by imposing equation [9] which will be referred to as the positive
payo constraint. Other relevant constraints include the maximum eort constraint, given
by equation [10] and the fact that optimal eort is non-negative. As can be seen, the bank
can benet from market imperfections for the entire fraction of the loan portfolio sold to
outside investors when the equity tranche is not expected to be exhausted.
However, once it allows the equity tranche to get exhausted in the low state of nature, then
it will only benet from market frictions in the high state of nature. Furthermore, because
the expected value of the senior claim in the low state of nature is less than the promised
14payment, outside investors will rationally take this into account and therefore only oer to
pay the amount pLPL(e) upfront. That is, outside investors will consider the optimal eort
level of the originator when deciding about the upfront payment.8 This is summarized by
Proposition [2].
Proposition 2 If the equity tranche is expected to be exhausted in the low state of nature,
the maximization problem is given by
max
e;t E2(e;t) = pLPL(e
) + pH(1   t





  kEt   1 (12)
s:t: BE(t)  PH(e) (13)
e  1    (14)
e  0 (15)
where [13] is the positive payo constraint of equity tranche holders in the high state of nature
and the minimum and maximum eort constraints [15] and [14] consider the fact that the
probability of making a good loan is bounded by zero and one.
Depending on whether expected prot is higher by selling riskless or risky debt, the bank
will choose eort and tranche size accordingly. The optimal solution thus depends on the
choice between riskless and risky senior claims and on whether the imposed constraints are
individually or jointly binding. Due to the complexity of the corresponding optimal policy
8Put dierently, the value of the senior tranche in the low state is given by min[(1   t)R;PL(e)] which
equals PL(e) in case of default. Because the eort level is non-contractible, outside investors will only make
an upfront payment of pLPL(e) for the expected value of the senior claim in the low state of nature. The
bank in turn will not maximize its eort level over the upfront payment as it is not able to contract upon
this eort.
15functions, the presentation of the closed form solutions to Propositions [1] and [2] is limited
to the the Appendix whereas the corresponding interpretation of the results is deferred to
Section [3].
2.2 Mezzanine Tranche Retention
In case the bank retains the mezzanine tranche of the structured product, the corresponding
payout structure is similar to holding subordinated or junior debt. The downside risk is
lower due to the fact that the equity tranche serves as a rst buer to absorb losses whereas,
the upside potential is limited and equal to the promised payments. Specically, the payo
structure is given by
FM(e;t) = min[maxfPL(e)   BM(t);0g;tR]pL
+ min[maxfPH(e)   BM(t);0g;tR]pH
(16)
where BM(t) = (1   2t)R is the strike price of mezzanine tranche holders and denotes
promised payments to senior tranche holders. Because the maximum payment mezzanine
tranche holders can receive is capped at tR, they will only exert so much screening eort
as to guarantee this payo in the low state of nature. This in turn implies that the equity
tranche will be exhausted in this case.
Combining above together with the fact that the payo in the high state of nature is
always larger than the payo in the low state, i.e. PH(e) > PL(e), the expected value of the
16equity tranche, and thus the value of the upfront payment for selling the equity tranche, is
given by pH (PH(e)   BE(t)).9 Using this together with Assumptions [1] to [3], Proposition
[3] is as follows.
Proposition 3 Under mezzanine tranche retention, if the bank sells riskless debt and the
equity tranche is not expected to be exhausted in the high state of nature, the maximization
problem is given by
max
e;t M(e;t) = pH (PH(e
)   BE(t)) + (1   4t





2   kMt   1 (17)
s:t: BM(t)  PL(e) (18)
PL(e)  BE(t) (19)
e  1    (20)
e  0 (21)
where [18] is the positive payo constraint of mezzanine tranche holders in the low state of
nature, [19] is the maximum payo constraint of mezzanine tranche holders in the low state
of nature and the minimum and maximum eort constraints [21] and [20] consider the fact
that the probability of making a good loan is bounded by zero and one.
It can be seen that in addition to the positive payo constraint which is necessary to
guarantee that the senior tranche is riskless, there is an additional constraint given by equa-
tion [19]. This condition considers the fact that it is not optimal for mezzanine tranche
9The intuition for the upfront payment is similar to Proposition [2]. Investors rationally take into account
that the bank has no incentive to consider the upfront payment (it receives for selling the equity tranche)
in the maximization problem and therefore oer an upfront payment which conditions upon the optimal
anticipated eort level, i.e. they pay pH (PH(e)   BE(t)) upfront.
17holders to exert more eort than to guarantee its promised payment and will therefore be
referred to as the maximum payo constraint.
Clearly, the maximization problems for equity and mezzanine tranche retention provide
dierent incentives to screen loans and although we obtain the optimal screening eort and
tranche size as closed form solutions, it is practically impossible to judge which retention
mechanism dominates the other due to the various kinks in the payo functions. The next
section will therefore present numerical examples using the solutions to Propositions [1] to
[3] which are provided in the Appendix.10
3 Numerical Analysis
This section analyzes whether equity or mezzanine tranche retention results in higher loan
screening eort and it compares the protability of the two retention mechanisms. We
start our analysis by focusing on the stylized case of a market with high systematic and
idiosyncratic risk, having in mind a proxy for the subprime market. We then perform a
variety of robustness checks by varying the impact of screening costs, capital requirements
and loan protability as well as macroeconomic factors such as the systemic risk component
and the fraction of good quality borrowers.
3.1 Baseline Scenario
For the baseline scenario, it is assumed that three out of 10 borrowers in the economy are
classied as good ( = 0:3) and that the probability of entering a downturn is equal to 80
10Again, in principle one would also need to check whether it is optimal for the bank to make use of the
limited liability option in the high state of nature. For the same reason as before, we abstract from this case.
18percent. Furthermore, the gross return R is set to 1:1,  and  to 1. Following the Basel II
framework, the capital adequacy ratio is equal to 8 percent, risk weights for equity tranche
retention are set to 1250 percent while those of mezzanine tranche retention are equal to 100
percent.
We start our analysis by calculating implied screening eort for the case of equity and
mezzanine tranche retention. All eort levels will be displayed relative to the amount of eort
the bank would exert in case it retained the entire loan portfolio.11 Results are presented
for all default probabilities for which securitization is protable for at least one of the two
retention mechanisms.
The left panel in Figure [2] displays the amount of screening eort for both retention
mechanisms. It can be seen that for default probabilities of up to 12 percent, equity tranche
retention best incentivizes diligent loan screening and the bank would exert the same level
of due diligence as if it retained the entire loan portfolio. Mezzanine tranche retention, on
the other hand, implies a lower level of screening activity due to the fact that the maximum
payo constraint is binding. That is, given that the maximum payo the bank receives is
capped, it has no incentives to engage in more screening than necessary to guarantee this
amount. At the same time, the right panel of Figure [2] shows that substantially more credit
exposure is retained in the case of equity tranche retention.
From the perspective of a policy maker, the main interest lies in analyzing whether a prot
maximizing securitizer would actually choose equity or mezzanine tranche retention. Figure
[3] therefore displays prot levels under both retention schemes. It can be seen that the
11For a derivation of the corresponding optimal screening level, see Appendix.


































































Figure 2: Optimal Policies for Baseline Scenario: The left panel displays screening eort
under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green
line) relative to the case of full loan retention. The right panel shows optimal tranche size for
equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line).
Results are displayed for dierent default probabilities as long as securitization is protable for at
least one of the two retention mechanisms. The baseline scenario is characterized by assuming that
R = 1:1,  = 1, pH = 0:2,  = 0:3, CAR = 0:08, RWE = 1250% and RWM = 100%.
securitizer would choose equity tranche retention as long as the default probability is less
than roughly 5% and mezzanine tranche retention otherwise. Intuitively, this is because the
equity tranche is the rst to suer any losses which is why expected prots decline if the
default probability is increased.
This simple example shows that for the stylized case of a low quality market, i.e. high
fraction of bad borrowers and high chances of economic downturn, equity tranche retention
would not necessarily be the preferred choice of a prot maximizing bank even though it
best incentivizes loan screening.
Before discussing any potential policy implications, it is essential to obtain a rich un-
derstanding for how dierent scenarios aect results. We therefore vary the magnitude of































Figure 3: Protability for Baseline Scenario: The gure displays expected prots under equity
tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line) for dierent
default probabilities. The baseline scenario is characterized by assuming that R = 1:1,  = 1,
pH = 0:2,  = 0:3, CAR = 0:08, RWE = 1250% and RWM = 100%.
screening costs, capital charges and loan protability and assess its implications for expected
prots and screening activity. Then, we investigate the inuence of the macroeconomic en-
vironment, as measured by the fraction of good and low quality borrowers and the systemic
risk component on retention policy.
3.2 The Prot Drivers
3.2.1 The impact of loan screening costs
As a rst step, we analyze the impact of screening costs on the retention decision. Instead of
setting  equal to one, we assume a value of 5% reecting the intuition that for some credit
markets it might be easier to screen borrowers than for others.12
12In a dierent context, the Corporate Finance literature relating to agency costs of free cash ow frequently
assumes a value of 0:05 for the severity of the agency costs parameter. See for example Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2009).
21It turns out that due to the low costs of screening, the bank will exert maximum screening
eort under both equity and mezzanine tranche retention for default probabilities of approx-
imately 15% and higher which is visualized in the left panel of Figure [4]. For portfolios with
lower risk, mezzanine tranche retention leads again to less screening activity due to the fact
that the maximum payo to mezzanine tranche holders is capped.


































































Figure 4: Optimal Policies for Case of Low Screening Costs: The left panel displays screening
eort under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green
line) relative to the case of full loan retention. The right panel shows optimal tranche size for equity
tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line). Results are
displayed for dierent default probabilities as long as securitization is protable for at least one of
the two retention mechanisms. All parameter values are as in the baseline scenario except for the
screening cost parameter  which is set to 0.05.
The right panel of Figure [4] visualizes that implied retention when holding the equity
tranche is considerably higher than under mezzanine tranche retention. Also, it can be seen
that the optimal level of skin in the game under mezzanine tranche retention is piecewise
linear with respect to the default probability. First, the maximum payo constraint is binding
for default probabilities of up to 15%. At this threshold, also the maximum eort constraint
22becomes binding such that the cash ow in the low state of nature decreases with higher
default probabilities. The bank responds by optimally increasing the retention rate. Only
for default probabilities of 25% and higher, the maximum payo constraint becomes slack
such that the bank can keep the optimal retention level constant.
Finally, given the low costs of loan screening, securitization becomes more protable than
under the benchmark case. Figure [5] shows that equity tranche retention generates higher
expected prots than mezzanine tranche retention for default probabilities of up to 15%. Be-
yond that, mezzanine tranche retention becomes the preferred choice for default probabilities
of up to 40 percent.


























Figure 5: Protability for Case of Low Screening Costs: The gure displays expected prots
under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line)
for dierent default probabilities. All parameter values are as in the baseline scenario except for
the screening cost parameter  which is set to 0.05.
Comparing this result with the benchmark case illustrates how crucial it is that policymak-
ers have a good estimate of potential screening costs across dierent securitization markets
23before designing any active policy recommendation. If the costs of performing due diligence
are prohibitively high, then an unanimous imposition of equity tranche retention might not
lead to a higher level of screening activity but could just simply shut down certain credit
markets as equity tranche retention might not be protable in this case.
3.2.2 The impact of capital requirements
Capital requirements have a direct impact on the protability of securitization but they
aect equity and mezzanine tranche retention in a dierent way. To analyze the sensitivity
of the results with respect to capital charges while preserving their asymmetric inuence, we
therefore reduce their inuence in the prot function.
Figure [6] displays optimal screening eort and retention policy in case the distortion
parameter  is reduced to 0.10. The left panel shows that screening eort is largely unaected
by the costs of retaining funds and thus similar to the benchmark case. Focusing on the
implied retention rate, it can be seen that it becomes optimal to increase the amount of skin
in the game under equity tranche retention whereas the impact of lower capital charges on
mezzanine tranche retention is negligible.
Figure [7] shows that the region for which projects are nanced using equity tranche
retention more than doubles (with respect to the baseline scenario) to default probabilities
of up to 14% whereas again there is basically no impact on the protability under mezzanine
tranche retention. This is due to the fact that the initial risk weight under mezzanine
tranche retention is rather small which makes its impact negligible. Most importantly, equity
retention delivers both the highest expected prot and the highest level of loan screening
activity. While we do not argue that regulators should decrease the cost of retaining the


































































Figure 6: Optimal Policies for Low Capital Charges: The left panel displays screening eort
under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line)
relative to the case of full loan retention. The right panel shows optimal tranche size for equity
tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line). Results are
displayed for dierent default probabilities as long as securitization is protable for at least one of
the two retention mechanisms. All parameter values are as in the baseline scenario except for the
capital cost parameters kE and kM which are set to one tenth of its original value.
most risky asset, we want to emphasize the possible feedback eect on the incentives to
retain credit exposure.
3.2.3 The impact of loan protability
Finally, we analyze the eect of loan protability on implied screening and retention levels.
Increasing the gross return R to 1.4, Figure [8] shows that for default probabilities between
roughly 20% and 40%, mezzanine tranche retention leads to the same level of loan screening
as retention of the equity tranche.
The intuitive reason is that both the maximum eort and maximum payo constraint are
binding such that mezzanine tranche retention generates the full screening eort. However,


























Figure 7: Protability for Low Capital Charges: The gure displays expected prots under
equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line) for
dierent default probabilities. All parameter values are as in the baseline scenario except for the
capital cost parameters kE and kM which are set to one tenth of its original value.
for default probabilities of 37% and higher, both constraints become slack and thereby reveal
less due diligence under mezzanine tranche retention. At the same time, it can be seen that
higher protability allows the originator to optimally sell a larger fraction of the loan portfolio
under both equity and mezzanine tranche retention, relative to the benchmark case.
Finally, it turns out that mezzanine tranche retention always generates higher prots
than retaining the equity tranche. The reason is that equity tranche retention becomes
increasingly costly as the opportunity cost of capital charges are positively related to the
gross return R. Thus, because retention is more costly under equity tranche retention, the
bank optimally chooses to retain the mezzanine tranche in case loans promise a high expected
return. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in absolute values also equity tranche retention
becomes more protable than under the benchmark case. All eects are visualized in Figure
[9].

































































Figure 8: Optimal Policies for Case of High Protability: The left panel displays screening
eort under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed
green line) relative to the case of full loan retention. The right panel shows optimal tranche size
for equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line).
Results are displayed for dierent default probabilities as long as securitization is protable for at
least one of the two retention mechanisms. All parameter values are as in the baseline scenario
except for R which is set to 1.40
3.2.4 Intermediate Summary
Summing up, we have seen that capital charges have a strong impact on the incentives to
diligently screen loans and borrowers. This can be explained by the fact that in order for
equity retention to be eective, a prot maximizing bank has to ensure that the next risky
tranche is safe and this is achieved by increasing the thickness of the equity tranche. While
this leads to the highest possible screening eort, it also reduces expected prots compared
to the case of mezzanine retention due to the comparably much higher capital charges. This
feedback eect even gets more pronounced in case gross prot is high as the opportunity
costs of retaining funds become increasingly expensive in this case. While we do not argue
that capital costs should be reduced to restore banks' incentives to retain the equity tranche,


























Figure 9: Protability for Case of High Protability: The gure displays expected prots
under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line)
for dierent default probabilities. All parameter values are as in the baseline scenario except for R
which is set to 1.40
it is important to consider this negative feedback eect when giving regulatory advice.
Another factor inuencing the retention decision is the magnitude of loan screening costs.
We have seen that once it becomes cheaper to screen, more projects receive nancing. How-
ever, at the same time this makes high screening eort under mezzanine tranche retention
also much more likely.
It is therefore crucial that regulators have a good estimate of loan screening costs and
the relative protability of the dierent credit markets in order to avoid any of the above
mentioned undesired eects.
283.3 The Eect of the Macroeconomic Environment
The results presented so far have focused on a stylized credit market characterized by a
large fraction of low quality borrowers and a high chance of an economic downturn. We now
relax this assumption and present results for dierent levels of systematic risk and varying
fractions of good and low quality borrowers.
3.3.1 The impact of the future state of the economy
Figure [10] displays optimal screening activity, tranche retention and prot levels for equity
and mezzanine retention under dierent economic scenarios. Under the rst one, we assume
that the economy will enter a recession with 90% probability, under the second one we make
no directional assumption regarding the future state of the economy and nally we set the
probability of entering an upturn equal to 70 percent.
It can be seen that if an economic downturn is expected, then only projects with default
probabilities of up to 8% would receive nancing and equity tranche retention would be the
preferred choice both in terms of screening eort and protability. On the other hand, if
chances of an economic upturn are 50% or higher, then more projects are nanced and a
prot maximizing bank would always choose to retain the mezzanine tranche, even though
equity tranche retention becomes more protable in absolute terms. The main reason is that
the positive economic outlook allows the bank to save on screening costs in case the less
risky mezzanine tranche is retained.
The same eect can be observed in case the economy is expected to perform well. The
lower left panel of Figure [10] shows that the optimal level of due diligence under mezzanine










































































































































































































































Figure 10: Optimal Policies For Dierent Economic Outlooks: The left panel displays
screening eort under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention
(dashed green line) relative to the case of full loan retention. The right panel shows optimal
tranche size for equity tranche retention (solid blue line), mezzanine tranche retention (dashed
green line) as well as prots under equity tranche retention (red with asterisk) and mezzanine
tranche retention (dashed-dotted turquoise). Results are displayed for dierent default probabilities
as long as securitization is protable for at least one of the two retention mechanisms. The rst
row displays results in case pH = 0:1, the second row in case pH = 0:5 and the third row in case
pH = 0:7. All other parameter values are as in the baseline scenario.
30tranche retention is considerably below the amount implied by retaining the equity tranche.
At rst, the eort level is downward sloping as none of the constraints are binding. Only
when default probabilities are higher than approximately 15%, the bank starts to increase
the level of retention and keeps the amount of loan screening constant. While a prot
maximizing bank would favor mezzanine tranche retention, equity tranche retention also
generates prots for a wider range of parameter values. A potential policy implication would
be to advocate equity tranche retention in times when expectations regarding the future
state of the economy are good in order to avoid that banks systemically save on screening
costs and capital charges.
3.3.2 The impact of loan quality
We now assess how the quality of a given credit market inuences loan screening activities
and therefore change the fraction of high quality borrowers in the economy. Figure [11]
displays optimal screening eort, retention policy and protability when the parameter  is
set to 50% or 80%. We can see that for both cases, equity tranche retention delivers the
highest screening eort but it would only be chosen by the originator if default probabilities
are relatively low. One can thus observe a similar pattern as for the benchmark case.
3.3.3 A high quality market
Finally, we investigate how the combination of higher loan quality and less systematic risk
aects screening eort and retention. We therefore display optimal policies and prot levels
for the case of a high quality market, i.e. we set the parameter  equal to 60% and assume
that the chances of entering an economic up- or downturn are equal.
























































































































































Figure 11: Optimal Policies For Dierent Loan Quality: The left panel displays screening
eort under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed
green line) relative to the case of full loan retention. The right panel shows optimal tranche size for
equity tranche retention (solid blue line), mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line) as well as
prots under equity tranche retention (red with asterisk) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed-
dotted turquoise). Results are displayed for dierent default probabilities as long as securitization
is protable for at least one of the two retention mechanisms. The rst row displays results in case
 = 0:5 and the second row in case  = 0:8. All other parameter values are as in the baseline
scenario.
32Figure [12] displays corresponding results. It can be seen that for nearly all levels of
default risk, a prot maximizing bank would choose to retain the mezzanine tranche. At
the same time, the implied screening level is considerably below the one implied by equity
tranche retention. Similar to before, this is because rst the maximum payo constraint is
binding and then the bank maximizes screening eort according to its unconstrained solution.
Besides, the right panel of Figure [12] shows that the optimal retention size when holding the
mezzanine tranche is considerably lower than under equity tranche retention. Thus it seems
again that once the expected outlook is of neutral to good quality, mezzanine retention would
be the preferred choice due to a combination of lower screening costs and capital charges.












































































Figure 12: Optimal Policies For High Quality Market: The left panel displays screening
eort under equity tranche retention (solid blue line) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed
green line) relative to the case of full loan retention. The right panel shows optimal tranche size for
equity tranche retention (solid blue line), mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line) as well as
prots under equity tranche retention (red with asterisk) and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed-
dotted turquoise). Results are displayed for dierent default probabilities as long as securitization
is protable for at least one of the two retention mechanisms. All parameter values are as in the
baseline scenario except for pH and  which are set to 0.5 and 0.6.
334 Alternative Specication
This section presents two additional robustness checks. First, we show that retention of a
vertical slice is unlikely to incentivize the originator to exert higher screening eort than
implied under equity and mezzanine tranche retention. Second, we consider an alternative
and simpler risk specication which isolates the eect of the low quality borrower's default
risk. This further weakens the incentives to perform due diligence under mezzanine tranche
retention.
4.1 Vertical Tranche Retention
The objective of this section is to briey demonstrate that vertical slice retention is unlikely
to adequately incentivize the originator to perform due diligence. While the mathematical
arguments follow Fender and Mitchell (2009), it should be noted that the implications are
profoundly dierent in combination with the results presented in Sections [2] and [3].
From a practical perspective, retaining a vertical slice of the loan portfolio implies that the
originator retains equal amounts of each single tranche. It has been shown that the payo
structure of equity tranche retention is given by
FE(e;t) = pL maxfPL(e)   BE(t);0g + pH maxfPH(e)   BE(t);0g
whereas for the case of mezzanine tranche retention it follows that
34FM(e;t) = min[maxfPL(e)   BM(t);0g;tR]pL
+ min[maxfPH(e)   BM(t);0g;tR]pH
Similarly, the payo structure of retaining the senior tranche can be written as
FS(e;t) = pL min[BE(t);PL(e)] + pH min[BE(t);PH(e)] (22)
Recognizing that the total cash ow of retaining a vertical slice with thickness tV is given
by holding a fraction tV of the equity, mezzanine and senior tranche, it follows that
FV(e) = tV [pLPL(e) + pHPH(e)] (23)
where FV(e) denotes the cash ow stemming from vertical slice retention. In other words,
the cash ow of retaining a vertical slice of thickness tV corresponds to retaining a pro-rata
fraction tV of the entire loan portfolio.
To show that vertical slice retention leads to a lower level of screening activity than reten-
tion of the equity tranche, it suces to solve the following general maximization problem.
Proposition 4 Under vertical tranche retention, the maximization problem of the originator
is given by
35max




2   kVtV   1 (24)
e  1    (25)
e  0 (26)












[(2pH   1)PD   pH + 1] R
;1   
i
corresponds to the screening level when
fully retaining the loan portfolio.
Proof: See Appendix.
The derivation shows that the optimal screening level under vertical slice retention is
proportional to the eort level exerted when fully retaining the loan portfolio. This implies
that retaining a vertical slice with a thickness of 10 percent would induce the originator to
exert (only) 10 percent of the amount implied when retaining the entire loan portfolio. It
should be noted that this result is quite general and unless one assumes a benet function of
securitization which penalized securitization and implied full retention, the eort level under
vertical slice retention will always be less than under full retention. Put dierently, as long
as there is some benet to securitization, vertical slice retention will always generate less
screening eort than full loan retention.
Given the analysis presented in Section [3], this result has important practical conse-
quences. First, equity tranche retention always dominates vertical slice retention as under
36all cases considered, it induced the originator to exert as much eort as under full loan reten-
tion. Second, even mezzanine tranche retention is likely to dominate vertical slice retention
as the implied eort level was constantly larger than 50 percent of the amount exerted un-
der full loan retention. In fact, the average eort level under mezzanine tranche retention
was around 70-80 percent of the amount of due diligence exerted under full loan retention,
thereby implying that the size of the vertical slice should be around 70-80 percent in order
to similarly incentivize loan screening.
4.2 A Simplied Model
This section presents a simplied model in which default risk only matters in the low state
of nature. Specically, it is assumed that there are no defaults in the high state of nature
and that only the bad quality borrower faces a probability of defaulting in the low state
of nature. This allows us to separately analyze the impact of borrower specic default risk
on the incentives to perform due diligence and thereby get a richer understanding for the
dynamics of the full model.
Focusing on the baseline scenario presented in Section [3], Figure [13] displays optimal
screening eort for the case of equity and mezzanine tranche retention. It can be seen
that equity tranche retention best incentivizes loan screening as the originator would exert
the same amount of screening eort as in the case of full loan retention. This is to be
expected given that the simplied model removes the potentially disturbing impact of the
systemic risk factor such that high performance states become fully indicative of screening
eort.13 Focusing on the case of mezzanine tranche retention, it can be seen that the optimal
13That is, if anything, the eort level under equity tranche retention should be at least as high as in the
context of systemic risk.
37screening level is more extreme than in the case of systemic risk. That is, as long as the
mezzanine tranche is safe, it is optimal for the originator not to screen any loans and to
avoid the cost of performing due diligence. At some threshold it becomes optimal to start
performing due diligence, but the amount of eort is considerably below the case of equity
tranche retention.14 This is dierent from the full model in which the presence of systemic
risk inuences the probability of default in both states of nature.



























Figure 13: Optimal Screening Eort under Alternative Risk Specication for Baseline
Scenario: This gure displays screening eort under equity tranche retention (solid blue line)
and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line) relative to the case of full loan retention. All
parameter values are as in the baseline scenario but it is assumed that (1) default does not matter
in the high state of nature and (2) only the bad borrower faces default risk in the low state of
nature.
The distortion becomes even more apparent in case the probability of the low state is
reduced. Figure [14] displays optimal screening level in case the probability of the high state
is equal to 70 percent. In that case, mezzanine tranche retention would only incentivize any
14Note that the lower eort level results from the fact that the maximum eort constraint is binding, i.e.
the originator does not receive the full upside potential in case of mezzanine tranche retention.
38screening activity in case the default probability exceeds approximately 30 percent. This is
inherently dierent to the behavior implied by the full model in which mezzanine tranche
retention induced the originator to exert high screening eort for low default probability
states. The reason is that for the full model the originator chooses screening eort according
to its unconstrained solution and then has to make sure that the mezzanine tranche is
safe whereas in the case presented here, the optimal strategy switches from no screening to
exerting a positive and signicant amount of due diligence.



























Figure 14: Optimal Screening Eort under Alternative Risk Specication in case
pH = 0:7: This gure displays screening eort under equity tranche retention (solid blue line)
and mezzanine tranche retention (dashed green line) relative to the case of full loan retention. All
parameter values are as in the baseline scenario except for pH which is set to 0.7 and it is assumed
that (1) default does not matter in the high state of nature and (2) only the bad borrower faces
default risk in the low state of nature.
Concluding, it can be seen that the relation between default risk and screening is much
simpler without considering systemic risk. In this case, higher default probabilities are
associated with higher screening activities whereas in the case of systemic risk this is not
necessarily the case. This is because the optimal screening level has a dierent exposure
39to the systemic risk factor across the two retention mechanisms which is why the optimal
behavior is dierent and more complex.
5 Conclusion
This paper compares the eects of equity and mezzanine tranche retention by investigating
the corresponding incentives of a loan securitizing bank to screen loans and retain skin in
the game. The analysis accounts for systemic risk, moral hazard and accounting frictions.
We nd that equity tranche retention generates the highest possible screening eort but,
most of the time, a prot maximizing bank will choose to retain the mezzanine tranche
and therefore exert less screening eort. The intuitive reason is given by the fact that
both screening costs and capital charges are higher under equity retention than in case the
mezzanine tranche was retained.
The paper also illustrates the importance of obtaining accurate estimates of loan screening
costs for risk requirement regulations. In that light, an unanimous imposition of equity
tranche retention in case of high loan screening costs might run the danger of shutting down
certain areas of securitization markets. Regulators should also be aware that while higher
protability generally makes securitization more protable, it also reduces banks' incentives
to retain the equity tranche due to higher implied opportunity costs associated with capital
requirements.
Finally, it is also shown that a more positive economic outlook allows the bank to save
on screening costs in case the less risky mezzanine tranche is retained. That is, a prot
40maximizing bank would choose to retain the mezzanine tranche even though the implied
screening level is only suboptimal from a regulator's point of view. The analysis therefore
suggests that a more dynamic and countercyclical risk retention requirement policy could
vary with the business cycle by, for example, requiring equity retention during boom periods.
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43A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition [1]
Proof.
[Proof] The maximization problem is as follows
max
e;t E1(e;t) = (1   t





2   kEt   1   1 [PL(e)   BE(t)]   2 [e +    1]   3( e)
(28)





















kE(1   PD)   [2PD2   2(pH + 2   1)PD + pH + 2   2]R




 = 1   (1   PD)( + e
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(30)




 = 1   (1   PD)
(31)
Note that 2 = 3 > 0 is not possible. Also, 1 = 2 = 0 and 3 > 0 is not possible for
PD 2 [0;1].
A.2 Proof of Proposition [2]
Proof.
[Proof] The maximization problem is as follows
max
e;t E2(e;t) = pLPL(e
) + pH(1   t





  kEt   1   1 [PH(e)   BE(t)]   2 [e +    1]   3( e)
(32)
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 = (1   )PD
(35)
Note that 2 = 3 > 0 is not possible. Also, 1 = 2 = 0 and 3 > 0 is not possible for
PD 2 [0;1].
46A.3 Proof of Proposition [3]
Proof. The maximization problem is given as follows.
max
e;t
M(e;t) = pH (PH(e
)   BE(t)) + (1   4t





  1   1 [BM(t)   PL(e)]   2 [PL(e)   BE(t)]   3 [e +    1]   4( e)
(36)
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kM(1   PD)   (8PD2   (pH + 16   7)PD + pH + 8   7)R





 = 1   (1   PD)( + e
)
(40)
If 1 = 4 > 0 and 2 = 3 = 0, the solution is given by
e
 = 0 (41)
t




If 2 = 4 > 0 and 1 = 3 = 0, the solution is given by
e
 = 0 (43)
t
 = [1   (1   PD)]
(44)
Note that 4 = 3 > 0 is not possible. Also, 1 = 2 = 3 = 0 and 4 > 0 is not possible
for PD 2 [0;1].
48A.4 Full Loan Retention
Letting the subscript R denote the case of full loan retention, the maximization problem is
as follows
max





2   kR   1   1 [e +    1]   2( e)
(45)









A.5 Proof of Proposition [4]
Proof.
[Proof] The maximization problem is as follows
max





2   kVtV   1   1 [e +    1]   2( e)
(46)




tV [(2pH   1)PD   pH + 1]
R

;1   

50